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Abstract 
This paper tests the presence of an ‘entrepreneurial imprinting effect’ of founders’ human 
capital on entrepreneurial ventures’ performance. More specifically, we empirically explore 
the impact of entrepreneurs’ human capital on a firm’s sales growth performance by 
disentangling the effect of the stock of human capital possessed at foundation from the 
potential injections and losses of human capital due to exit of founders and/or addition of new 
owner-managers in the entrepreneurial team over time. Our analysis is based on a panel 
dataset composed of 338 Italian new technology-based firms (NTBFs) observed from 1995 
(or since their foundation) to 2008 (or until their exit from the dataset). We consider the 
effects of several dimensions of entrepreneurial human capital on firm sales growth and 
estimate Gibrat law-type dynamic panel data models using OLS estimator and GMM-system 
estimator to control for endogeneity. Overall, our results point to a positive and significant 
presence of an ‘entrepreneurial imprinting effect’ exerted by founders’ specific work 
experience on venture growth which is robust to a series of controls. 
 
JEL classification: L25, L26, O31 
Keywords: Entrepreneurial ventures, imprinting effect, entrepreneurs’ human capital, firm 





The idea that organisms in the early stages of their life are incredibly receptive and 
unconsciously learn from their environment is well accepted. As a consequence, these first 
experiences leave an imprint on the organism which has an enduring effect on its behavior. 
This ‘imprinting effect’ has been studied in a wide spectrum of scientific disciplines 
including ethology (e.g. from Spalding’s and Heinroth’s early studies that inspired Konrad 
Lorenz’s research on graylag geese) to psychology (e.g. Sigmund Freud), evolutionary 
biology and epidemiology. It has also been studied in the field of organization science. 
Stinchcombe (1965) proposed the ‘organization imprinting hypothesis’, which states that the 
initial stages of development of human organizations play a major role in their subsequent 
progress through their influence on managerial structure and conduct, and their interaction 
with the external environment.  
Since then, organizational sociologists, entrepreneurship researchers and management 
scholars have emphasized the relevance of imprinting and the path-dependence of 
organizational evolution. As a consequence, the importance of ‘initial conditions’ for 
understanding the evolution of human organizations is well known (e.g. Boeker, 1988, 1989; 
Baron, Hannan, & Burton, 1999).1 With regard to entrepreneurial ventures, one of the most 
important imprinting forces – other than the environment in which the birth of a new venture 
takes place (‘environmental imprinting’) – is the human capital endowment of the founders 
(‘entrepreneurial imprinting’). In this case, the argument resembles Lorenz’s original filial 
imprinting (Lorenz, 1937): the members of the founding team represent the parents of the 
new venture and their actions, knowledge, competences, ideas, implemented strategies (and 
routines) before, during and immediately after the firm’s inception will indelibly mark the 
                                                            
1 Boeker (1988, p. 34, italics in original) states: “while organizations undergo modifications and display varying 
degrees of flexibility, they are cast at birth into a mold that is discernible in all subsequent stages of their life 
cycle”. 
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new entrepreneurial venture for the rest of its life, even after the original founders have left 
the organization.  
Building on the competence- and resource-based view of the firm, the empirical 
evidence suggests a (weak) positive relationship between founders’ human capital and the 
performance of new entrepreneurial ventures over time (see the meta-analysis by Unger et al., 
2011). However, most of the analyses do not provide support of a founders’ imprinting effect. 
As we show in this paper, the typical research design in the field is unable to properly test the 
entrepreneurial imprinting hypothesis for the simple fact that studies on the topic do not 
observe the evolution of entrepreneurs’ human capital over time. For example, they do not 
account for the exit of founders and/or the addition of new owner-managers in the 
entrepreneurial team. This makes it impossible to disentangle how much of the (positive) 
impact of entrepreneurs’ human capital is due to the imprinting effect and how much is due to 
on-going changes in the composition of the entrepreneurial team.  
Recognizing this lacuna in the entrepreneurship literature, we undertake a deeper 
investigation of the ‘entrepreneurial imprinting effect’ on the sales growth performance of 
Italian entrepreneurial ventures. Somewhat surprisingly, although there are recent imprinting-
related studies examining the influence of founders’ human capital on the evolution of 
venture’s size (e.g. Roberts, Klepper, & Hayward, 2011), growth and professionalization 
(Colombo & Grilli, 2005, 2010, 2013), alliance network evolution (e.g. Milanov & 
Fernhaber, 2009), and commercialization strategies (Conceição, Fontes, & Calapez, 2012), 
there are no studies which explicitly test the imprinting effect exerted by founders’ human 
capital on entrepreneurial venture performance. Understanding the nature and size of this 
effect will aid in developing our understanding of the dynamics of entrepreneurship and the 
determinants of entrepreneurial venture performance. This issue has also important policy 
and social welfare implications since (high-tech) entrepreneurial ventures are a key driver of 
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the dynamic efficiency of modern economies (Audretsch, 1995; Aspelund, Berg-Utby, & 
Skjevdal, 2005). Thus, from a policy perspective, it is important to understand the factors that 
underpin their economic performance.  
We perform our analysis on an unbalanced panel dataset composed of 338 Italian new 
technology-based firms (NTBFs) observed from 1995 (or since their foundation) to 2008 (or 
from their exit from the dataset).2 Grounded in the vast empirical literature on the evolution 
of firm growth over time known as Gibrat’s Law (Chesher, 1979; Evans, 1987), we estimate 
augmented Gibrat law-type dynamic panel data models by OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) and 
also controlling for the potential endogeneity of (some) independent variables through a 
GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) - system estimator for panel data (Blundell & 
Bond, 1998). In doing so, we estimate the impact of several dimensions of entrepreneurial 
human capital on venture sales growth performance.  
Following Becker (1975) and a consolidated empirical literature on the impact of 
founders’ human capital on NTBF growth and related performance (Colombo, Delmastro, & 
Grilli, 2004; Colombo & Grilli 2005, 2010; Ganotakis, 2012), we make the distinction 
between the generic and specific components of human capital. According to Colombo & 
Grilli (2005, p. 796): 
“…generic human capital relates to the general knowledge acquired by entrepreneurs 
through both formal education and professional experience. Specific human capital consists 
of capabilities that founders can directly apply to the entrepreneurial job in the newly 
created firm. These include knowledge of the industry in which the new firm operates, that 
is industry-specific human capital obtained by founders through prior work experience in the 
same industry. They also include knowledge of how to manage a new firm, that is 
entrepreneur-specific human capital; this is developed by founders through “leadership 
experience” (Brüderl, Preisendörfer, & Ziegler, 1992)”.  
                                                            
2 This study adheres to the gold standard definition of a ‘new technology-based firm’ originally due to Arthur D. 
Little (1977) that identifies a NTBF as an independent firm less than 25 years old and active in high technology 
industries.   
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In order to properly test the imprinting hypothesis on venture growth, our research 
design also controls for new owner-managers entering the entrepreneurial team and founders 
exiting the venture. Overall, our results point to a robust, positive and statistically significant 
presence of an ‘entrepreneurial imprinting effect’ in relation to the component of specific 
human capital represented by founders’ pre-entry work experience in the same sector as the 
start-up. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we identify the main challenges 
from an empirical point of view of investigating the “entrepreneurial imprinting effect”. 
Then, we briefly synthesize the extant literature and we develop our research hypotheses. In 
the following sections, we describe the dataset, and the estimation methodologies we employ. 
The results of the analysis along with some robustness checks follows. Finally, a discussion 
of the main findings and their implications concludes the paper. 
 
Technical aspects of testing the imprinting hypothesis 
In psychology and child development studies investigating the relationship between 
the early phases of child development and their subsequent adult behaviour, the use of a 
“direct” research design is deemed as unsuited to the analysis of the imprinting effect because 
it is infeasible for individuals to deduce ex-post how much initial events and parents’ 
education affected their subsequent behaviour. The same difficulties arise in our empirical 
context. We cannot ask the present owner-managers of a successful venture to evaluate if – 
and to what extent – their success depends on their knowledge and competences or by the 
original founding team at venture’s inception. Due to causal ambiguity (e.g. Lippman & 
Rumelt, 1982; Peteraf, 1993) or simply respondents’ lack of information and subjectivity, the 
reliability of this direct approach is highly questionable.  
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The way imprinting effects are typically investigated in psychological studies is 
through an indirect method where individuals’ genetic and/or environmental characteristics at 
birth are put into relation with subsequent observable individuals’ actions and outcomes in 
order to infer the degree of dependence across time (e.g. Kisilevsky et al., 2003; Rushton & 
Bons 2005). The indirect approach is also applied by the extant empirical literature 
investigating the impact of human capital characteristics of founders (in primis education and 
work experience) on the (growth) performance of entrepreneurial ventures. In fact, the typical 
model specification employed by econometric studies in the field uses a dependent variable 
of the performance of firm i at time t+n, regressed on a series of variables measuring 
founders’ human capital at the founding time t (e.g. see Unger et al., 2011 for a review).  
This archetypal regression suffers from two important shortcomings in the light of a 
test for an entrepreneurial imprinting effect. First, the estimations are commonly run on 
samples that do not have sufficient heterogeneity in terms of founding team evolution (i.e. 
exit of founders or addition of new owner-managers in the entrepreneurial team) over time 
(e.g. Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven 1990; Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon, & Woo, 1994; Gimeno et 
al., 1997; Almus & Nerlinger, 1999). In other words, n is typically small and t+n is close to 
t,3 so that a positive impact of founders’ human capital on entrepreneurial venture 
performance may simply reflect the fact that skilled and educated entrepreneurs run their 
ventures better than unskilled and uneducated ones. In addition, if n is sufficiently large and 
t+n is much larger than t, the standard model specification controls for various founder-, 
firm-, industry- and geographical-specific variables, but it does not include any variables 
                                                            
3 Most of the studies in the field including those reported above in parentheses analyze firms that are well below 
the threshold of an age of 10 years from inception, with most of the analyzed samples composed by very young 
start-ups.  
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capturing the evolution of the entrepreneurial team over time (e.g. Thompson, 2005; 
Colombo & Grilli, 2005, 2010).4  
As a consequence, the existing empirical literature does not adequately analyse the 
existence of an entrepreneurial imprinting effect exerted on a venture performance by 
founders’ human capital. If the overall probability that a founding team changes increases 
over time, failure to control for this may lead to biased results. In fact, any potential positive 
relationship found between founders’ human capital and venture performance may not be due 
to an imprinting effect but simply driven by an omitted variable capturing the entrepreneurial 
team’s evolution dynamics which is correlated with founders’ human capital. For example, if 
entry (or exit) into (from) the original founding team of smart new owner-managers 
(founders) is correlated with the level of human capital originally possessed by founders, it is 
impossible to discern whether the current performance of the firm is driven by the imprinting 
of the original founding team or simply the result of the present managerial conducts and 
strategies.  
 
Related literature and research hypotheses 
Many scholars in entrepreneurship have focused on examining relationships between 
entrepreneurial characteristics and new venture performance (e.g., Eisenhardt & Schoonoven, 
1990; Feeser & Willard, 1990; Vesper, 1990; Ucbasaran et al., 2003; Vanaelst et al., 2006; 
Roberts, Klepper, & Hayward, 2011). On average, they have shown that entrepreneurs’ 
                                                            
4 Thompson (2005)’s study on the impact of founders’ pre-entry work experience on the survival of US ventures 
in the iron and steel shipbuilding industry of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is surely the one embracing 
the longest n (90 years). His Cox proportional hazard analysis documents that (p. 26): “preentry experience is 
found to have a large and extremely persistent effect on survival” and in so doing points to a potentially 
extremely relevant “entrepreneurial imprinting effect”. If the study in principle suffers from the limitation 
advanced in the main text (see infra), the extremely wide time horizon analysed makes it less pertinent with 
respect to other studies. In this respect, Thompson’s (2005) study (without explicitly ever saying it) can be 
viewed as the first important evidence of the effect of entrepreneurial imprinting on firm survival.  
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human capital (education and experience) is positively related to entrepreneurial venture 
performance (Unger et al., 2011). In other words: high growth firms are more likely to be 
founded and run by teams of entrepreneurs with a high level of human capital (Cooper, 
Gimeno-Gascon, & Woo, 1994; McGee, Dowling, & Megginson, 1995; Feeser & Willard 
1990). The relationship between entrepreneurs’ human capital and firm performance appears 
to be particularly valuable in high-tech and research intensive industries (e.g. Cooper & 
Bruno, 1977) and relevant if some dimensions of human capital are considered. More 
specifically, what appears to matter in fostering growth performance for high-tech ventures is 
the ‘specific’ rather than the ‘generic’ component of human capital (see Becker, 1975, for this 
seminal distinction). Partly diverging from ‘the jack of all trades and master of none’ vision 
of the entrepreneur (e.g. Lazear, 2005), the empirical literature on NTBFs points to the 
former as the most relevant dimension in explaining growth performances of entrepreneurial 
ventures in high-tech industries (e.g. Almus & Nerlinger, 1999; Colombo & Grilli, 2005, 
2010; Ganotakis, 2012), where ‘specific’ human capital includes all those technical and 
commercial competencies that entrepreneurs can directly apply to the new business and have 
been primarily gained through professional experience in the same markets and industries on 
which their NTBF operates. The underlying theoretical reasoning is that more industry-
specific skilled individuals, ceteris paribus, are better able to identify and seize business 
opportunities (Shane, 2000; Shepherd & DeTienne, 2005; Ucbasaran, Westhead, & Wright, 
2008; Marvel, 2013 among many others), position their venture, and run it accordingly (and 
this is more important in highly turbulent and risky industries as typically are the R&D 
intensive ones).5 Therefore we posit the following research hypothesis, which constitutes our 
starting point on the investigation of the entrepreneurial imprinting hypothesis: 
                                                            
5 See Eisenhardt & Martin (2000) and Tyson (1992). 
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H1: Entrepreneurs’ specific human capital exerts a positive effect on the growth 
performance of high-tech entrepreneurial ventures. 
The performance of entrepreneurial ventures (and more specifically NTBFs) is 
reputed to be strongly influenced by initial resources (Boeker, 1988, 1989; Gersick, 1991; 
McDougall, Shane, & Oviatt, 1994). As suggested by Boeker (1988, 1989) and Bamford, 
Dean, & McDougall (1999), early resources and competences at founding date have lasting 
effects which imprint the firm, limit its strategic choice, and continue to impact its long-term 
performance. The early stages of a firm’s existence see the development of the organization’s 
routines that guide initial strategies and managerial decisions. Gersick (1991) illustrates an 
initial strategy through a decision tree: once one decision is made, the resulting strategic 
options are reduced. This path-dependent evolution of a high-tech start-up’s life is reputed to 
embrace a wide variety of firm strategies, ranging from commercialization policies (Arora & 
Gambardella, 2010; Conceição, Fontes, & Calapez, 2012) to alliance partners’ selection 
(Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Milanov & Fernhaber, 2009), passing through organizational 
design choices (Colombo & Grilli, 2013) and labor’s hiring policies (Burton & Beckman, 
2007).  
Starting from this presumption that initial strategies and early choices could limit the 
spectrum of a firm’s subsequent options, the theoretical argument underpinning the 
imprinting effect of founders’ specific human capital on high-tech venture growth 
performance resides in the fact that experienced and skilled entrepreneurs are more likely 
than inexperienced and unskilled ones to make at a firm’s inception the right choices and 
pursue the most appropriate initial strategies. Since these initial moves have a long-lasting 
effect and constrain subsequent options, successful strategic choices at a firm’s inception are 
more likely to breed successful strategic choices in later stages. This imprinting effect is 
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likely to benefit the firm regardless of the original founders’ actual involvement in the firm or 
a founder’s potential exit over the firm’s life.  
Most of the empirical work studying the relationship between founders’ human capital 
and firm growth performance assumes the existence of this imprinting effect without directly 
testing its actual presence (Almus & Nerlinger, 1999; Colombo & Grilli, 2005, 2010; 
Ganotakis, 2012 among others). As highlighted earlier, such studies do not control for the 
evolution dynamics characterizing the team of the original founders since they do not observe 
entry/exit of owner-managers.  
As a matter of fact, with regard to the entrepreneurial imprinting effect, most of the 
evidence is of a qualitative nature. For instance, Barringer, Jones, & Neubaum (2005) tell us 
about the Walt Disney anecdote (p. 666): “It is widely believed that the founders of a firm 
place a lasting ‘stamp’ on their companies that influences the cultures and behaviors of their 
firms (Mullins, 1996). For example, for years after the death of Walt Disney, Disney 
executives, when confronted with an important decision, would often ask aloud “What would 
Walt do?” (Collins & Porras, 1994). Similarly, Hewlett–Packard’s Rules of the Garage 
institutionalizes the values of its innovative founders [….].” 
Adhering to this view, we formulate the main hypothesis of our analysis: 
H2: Founders’ specific human capital exerts an imprinting effect: it has a positive 
effect on the growth performance of the high-tech entrepreneurial venture independently 
from the degree of erosion of the founding team. 
 
Data 
In this paper, we draw on a sample of 338 NTBFs that are observed either from 1995 
or from their foundation (if it is after 1995) up to 2008 (or the year of their exit from the 
dataset). Sample firms were established in 1983 or later and were independent at the time of 
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founding (i.e. they were not controlled by another business organization even though other 
organizations may have held minority shareholdings). They operated in the following high-
tech manufacturing and service industries: ICT manufacturing (i.e., computers; electronic 
components; telecommunication equipment; optical, medical and electronic instruments); 
biotechnology, pharmaceuticals and advanced materials; aerospace, robotics and process 
automation equipment; software; Internet and telecommunication services; environmental 
services; R&D and engineering services. All sample firms are privately held.  
The sample is drawn from the RITA directory (Research on Entrepreneurship in 
Advanced Technologies). Given the absence of reliable official statistics on the population of 
Italian NTBFs, the RITA directory is the most complete and detailed source of information 
presently available on this type of firm.6  
The directory was created by the RITA Observatory research team at Politecnico di 
Milano at the end of 1999 and was extended through the inclusion of new firms and the 
update of new information through other four different survey waves carried out in 2002, 
2004, 2007, and 2009. As a result, RITA is a survey-based dataset that includes information 
on a total of 1,979 NTBFs. The surveys were based on a questionnaire that was sent to the 
contact person of target firms (i.e., one of firm’s owner-managers) either by fax or by e-mail. 
Answers to the questions were checked for internal coherence by trained research assistants 
and were compared with information published in firms’ annual reports, on web sites and in 
the press. In several cases, phone or face-to-face follow-up interviews were made with firms’ 
                                                            
6 The use of official statistics in this domain is not possible for several reasons. First, in Italy most individuals 
who are defined as self-employed by official statistics (i.e., “independent employees”) actually are salaried 
workers with atypical employment contracts. Unfortunately, on the basis of official data such individuals cannot 
be distinguished from owner-managers of a new firm. This means that the official number of high-tech 
entrepreneurial ventures is enormously inflated, especially in sectors like software where atypical employment 
contracts are very popular. In addition, official data do not distinguish firms that were established by one or 
more entrepreneurs (i.e., owner-managed firms) from firms that were created as subsidiaries of other firms. This 
again inflates the number of high-tech entrepreneurial ventures. Lastly, there are no official statistics about 
M&As: therefore one cannot distinguish firms that were acquired by another firm and lost independence while 
keeping their legal status, from independent high-tech entrepreneurial ventures. 
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owner-managers. This final step provided an opportunity to collect missing data and ensured 
that the data were reliable.  
RITA constituted the empirical basis for several previous works on the relationship 
between entrepreneurs’ human capital and NTBF performances (e.g. Colombo, Delmastro, & 
Grilli, 2004; Colombo & Grilli, 2005, 2010). In this respect, it is important to stress that 
because of the criteria used for inclusion in the RITA directory, the dataset is unlikely to 
include lifestyle firms and firms that are created purely for tax-saving reasons. Another 
important strength of the dataset is its longitudinal nature so that firms surveyed in a wave 
have been included in the subsequent one, thus they are monitored over time. Among other 
things, this enabled us to track their eventual exit (because of cease of operations, bankruptcy 
or merger/acquisition with/by another firm) and allowed us to perform the survivorship bias 
test reported in the robustness checks section.  
The data collection process throughout the different survey waves was always carried 
out with the logic of ensuring representativeness (in terms of geographic location and sector 
affiliation) with the population of active Italian NTBFs in that specific time period. 
Accordingly, the construction of the population used information from a wide array of 
sources including: i) lists of the companies that are members of the national entrepreneurial 
associations of the focal industries; ii) lists of the members of the regional sections of the 
main Italian organisation representing manufacturing and services companies 
(Confindustria); iii) lists of the members of the local sites of Chambers of Commerce; and in 
2009 the Infocert dataset of the Union of Italian Chambers of Commerce; iv) lists of 
companies that participated in the most important industry trades and expositions; v) lists of 
companies that purchased advertising services in popular off-line (e.g., Kompass) and on-line 
(e.g., Infoimprese.it) directories; vi) a list of young firms that were granted a license to 
provide telecommunication services (including Internet access services) by the Italian 
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communication authority (AGCOM); vii) the population of high-tech entrepreneurial 
ventures that were incubated in a science park or a business innovation center (BIC) affiliated 
with the respective national associations; viii) the population of high-tech entrepreneurial 
ventures that obtained equity financing from VC investors included in the Italian financial 
investor association (AIFI); and ix) the population of VC-backed high-tech entrepreneurial 
ventures that were included in the Thomson One database. Lastly, information provided by 
the national financial press, specialised magazines, and other sectoral studies was also used in 
the compilation of the directory. For each firm, the name of a contact person (i.e., one of the 
owner-managers) and his/her personal email address was collected in order to administer the 
questionnaire. While the RITA directory is not exhaustive of all self-employment episodes in 
high-tech sectors, it nevertheless provides an extensive and accurate coverage of the 
population of Italian entrepreneurial ventures in this domain excluding lifestyle companies, 
non-growth oriented firms and other non-entrepreneurial entities.   
Among the 1,979 NTBFs included at 31/12/2012 in the RITA directory, we could 
reconstruct the complete history in terms of the whole founders’ and subsequent owner-
managers’ human capital background for a sample of 338 firms.7 The exclusion of firms for 
which we had incomplete data on the entire set of founders and owner-managers in the 
observed time span was a necessary step in order to perform a rigorous test of the 
entrepreneurial imprinting hypothesis. In this regard it is worth stressing that information 
provided by public data sources was also included in the RITA directory. In particular, data 
on firm sales were obtained through firms’ annual reports and balance sheets (sources: 
CERVED and AIDA - the Italian version of Bureau van Dijk's Amadeus database - 
commercial databases). Survey-based information on the background of firms’ owner-
                                                            
7 There are no statistically significant differences between the distribution of the 338 sample firms across 
geographic areas and industries of operation and the corresponding distributions of the 1,979 RITA population 
from which the sample was drawn (χ2(19)= 19.34 and χ2(9)= 16.07, respectively). 
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managers and founders and their entry/exit behavior was also triangulated (whenever 
possible) with alternative sources, and in particular with the official documentation provided 
by the Union of Italian Chambers of Commerce (i.e. Telemaco database). 
 
Methodology 
Growth measure  
Studies on growth and performance of entrepreneurial ventures have shown 
contrasting results. One possible cause might be the use of different growth measures such as 
sales growth (Lee, Lee, & Pennings, 2001), employment growth (Westhead & Birley, 1994), 
profitability (Spanos & Lioukas, 2001), or total assets (Achtenhagen, Melin, & Naldi, 2004). 
Delmar, Davidsson, & Gartner (2003) argue that there is no “one best way” of measuring 
growth because it is a multidimensional phenomenon. They showed that high-growth firms 
do not grow in the same way and that “what a ‘high-growth firm’ is, conceptually and 
operationally, is very dependent on the growth measure used (p. 211)”. Several scholars 
argue that traditional accounting-based indicators of profitability are inappropriate for NTBFs 
because most start-ups do not make any profit during their first years (Shane & Stuart, 2002). 
Sales growth (often measured as growth in total revenues; Hanks et al., 1993) is typically 
preferred as a measure of firm growth and financial performance of new ventures (Ardishvili 
et al., 1998) because it is relatively accessible, it applies to (almost) all sorts of firms, it is 
relatively insensitive to capital intensity and degree of integration (Delmar, Davidsson, & 
Gartner, 2003), and it is a direct proxy of market legitimacy and penetration. While 
technological progress and innovation may be labor saving (and so they are not reflected in a 
high-tech venture’s employment growth), successful innovators are expected to reach greater 
sales (Coad & Rao, 2006; Czarnitzki & Delanote, 2013). Accordingly, in this study we focus 
on sales growth as NTBF growth measure performance. 
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Econometric specification 
To test our hypotheses, we use an augmented Gibrat law specification (Chesher, 















     
Salesit is the natural logarithm of sales value at time t; EntrepreneurialTeamSHCit and 
EntrepreneurialTeamGHCit are vectors of variables capturing the stock of specific and 
generic human capital possessed by the owner-managers over time. In particular, we capture 
the level of competencies possessed by the founding team and observed at the firm’s 
foundation (t = 0), and how the possible entry/exit of owner-managers in subsequent years 
modifies the value of this variable by the corresponding injection or loss of human capital; Xit 
is a vector of control variables; Tt are year-dummies and finally εit are i.i.d. disturbance 
terms.8 The first research hypothesis H1 predicts that the variables capturing entrepreneurs’ 
specific human capital and included in the vector EntrepreneurialTeamSHCit are positive and 
statistically significant. 
To test hypothesis H2, we augment equation (1) with the additional vectors 
FoundingTeamSHCi and FoundingTeamGHCi which include the same variables of 
EntrepreneurialTeamSHCit and EntrepreneurialTeamGHCit but now these variables are 
measured only at foundation and are not time-varying. Thus, the new model specification 
becomes (equation 2): 
                                                            
8 We include year-dummies in the main specification in order to control for inflation and macro-economic 
shocks because a Wald test confirms their statistical significance (χ2(12)= 34.19). In this respect, note that the 
use of a deflated sales series leave results unchanged (results are available upon request from the authors). 
Conversely, industry effects are omitted because they are jointly insignificant in determining sectorial 



















.   
Support for hypothesis H2 requires that variables capturing founders’ specific human 
capital contained in FoundingTeamSHCi are positive and statistically significant. In fact, the 
vector of coefficients β3 measures the impact that founders’ specific human capital has on the 
sales growth of entrepreneurial ventures net of the contemporaneous impact that the present 
level of entrepreneurs’ specific human capital exerts on sales growth. In this respect, the 
coefficients β3 related to specific human capital represent a direct test of the entrepreneurial 
imprinting hypothesis. 
Definition of independent variables and descriptive statistics 
Definition of independent variables of interest and controls used in the empirical 
analysis is provided in Table 1. Starting from equation (1), EntrepreneurialTeamSHCit 
include: SpecWorkExpit is the total number of years of pre-entry work experience of owner-
managers in the same industry of firm i at time t; DSerialit is a dummy variable that equals 1 
for NTBFs with one or more owner-managers with a previous self-employment experience at 
time t. The vector of variables capturing owner-managers’ generic human capital, i.e. 
EntrepreneurialTeamGHCit, is composed of: OtherWorkExpit which is the total number of 
years of pre-entry work experience of owner-managers in other industries than the one of 
firm i at time t; while Educit is the total number of years of education at graduate and post-
graduate level of owner-managers of firm i at time t. In order to control for the size of the 
entrepreneurial team over time, we also add the control NOwnersit which is the number of 
owner-managers of firm i at time t. 
 Equation (2) augments model’s (1) specification with two additional vectors of 
variables related to founders’ human capital: FoundingTeamSHCi0 and FoundingTeamGHCi0. 
The two vectors comprise the same variables of EntrepreneurialTeamSHCit and 
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EntrepreneurialTeamGHCit, but now SpecWorkExpi0, DSeriali0, OtherWorkExpi0 and Educi0 
are measured at a firm’s inception and are time-invariant. In this case, NFoundersi0 controls 
for the size of the founding team. 
 Finally, the vector Xit controls for the age of the firm and its square term. In the 
robustness check section, this vector will be augmented with several other firm-level 
covariates in order to investigate if results on founders’ human capital are sensitive to some 
omitted variable bias. 
[Table 1 about here] 
  In Table 2, we provide a comprehensive set of summary statistics of all the variables 
used in the empirical analysis. In Table 3, we present statistics related to the changes 
occurred to human capital variables over time. They are computed on the 34.32% (116 firms 
out of 338) of our sample firms which experienced a change in the composition of the 
original founding team, with an injection and/or loss of one or more members. Differences 
are computed through the following formula: Variable(t)- Variable(foundation). Thus, a 
positive (negative) number means that the focal variable at time t is higher (lower) than the 
same variable at foundation, because of a greater entry (exit) of owner-managers into the 
team. Statistics show a remarkable variance in the variable of interest (minimum vs. 
maximum values, standard deviation’s values) but at the same time a good balance between 
losses and injections of human capital variables across firms, as highlighted by the low mean 
and median values. In particular, injections of generic human capital are slightly greater than 
corresponding losses (mean ΔEduc = 1.2890, mean ΔOtherWorkExp = 0.1379); while the 
reverse is true for specific human capital (mean ΔSpecWorkExp = -0.5452, mean ΔSerial = -
0.0082). 
[Table 2 about here] 
[Table 3 about here] 
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Estimation method 
First, models are estimated through OLS. In order to account for heteroskedasticity 
and for arbitrary autocorrelation within a firm, in OLS estimates we use a cluster-robust 
covariance matrix as the errors of the same NTBF observed over multiple years might be 
correlated.  
However, the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable among covariates and the 
potential endogenous nature of the relationship between the human capital of entrepreneurs 
after foundation and venture growth recommend the use of other estimation techniques. In 
fact, while the variables included in FoundingTeamSHCi0 and FoundingTeamGHCi0 are 
exogenous by construction, those included in EntrepreneurialTeamSHCit and 
EntrepreneurialTeamGHCit may not be. For example, a reverse causality concern may arise 
to the extent that past sales growth performances influence changes in the composition of 
entrepreneurial teams. In order to address the dynamic bias and other potential endogeneity 
problems, following the literature on dynamic panel data models (Blundell and Bond 1998), 
other than using OLS we also resort to the system generalized method of moments (GMM-
SYS) estimator.  
In GMM-SYS methodology, other than using lagged levels of the series as 
instruments for first differences equations, additional moment conditions are employed using 
first differences as instruments for variables in levels, starting from t-2 for all the endogenous 
variables.9 To evaluate the relevance of all the GMM-SYS estimates, we applied different 
(standard in the GMM-context) tests. First, we implemented the Arellano and Bond tests for 
first- and second-order serial autocorrelations of residuals (AR(1), AR(2)). If εit was not 
                                                            
9 The GMM-SYS estimator may also present few drawbacks. First, the use of a large number of instruments can 
result in significant finite sample bias. Moreover, measurement errors can cause potential distortions. In order to 
deal with both problems (Bond, 2002; Roodman, 2009), we estimate our models with a reduced instrument set, 
with moment conditions in the interval between t-2 and t-5. Note also that pseudo-first stage regressions were 
run in order to gauge the goodness of such instruments. Results corroborate the robustness of the employed 
GMM-SYS estimator: F-statistics for the statistical significance of instruments in first differences are always 
greater than 10, which is the commonly accepted threshold (see Staiger & Stock, 1997).  
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serially correlated, the difference of residuals should have been characterized by a negative 
first-order serial correlation and the absence of a second-order serial correlation. Then, the 
Hansen test for the validity of overidentifying restrictions was implemented for each 
regression. These statistics tested the null hypothesis that the specified orthogonality 
conditions are equal to zero (Hansen, 1982). The failure to reject the null hypothesis indicated 
that the instruments are valid. Finally, in all GMM estimations the autoregressive coefficient 
is not close to the unity, thus excluding any stationarity concerns. All these tests reassure us 
on the feasibility of the GMM approach. 
 
Results 
Test of the hypotheses 
Tables 4 and 5 show the results of the estimation of equations [1] and [2], 
respectively.  
[Table 4 about here] 
[Table 5 about here] 
With regard to our first hypothesis, we found that only entrepreneurs’ specific work 
experience exerts a positive and significant effect on the sales growth of entrepreneurial 
ventures: the coefficient of SpecWorkExpit is positive and significant at 5% level in OLS 
estimates and at 10% in GMM-SYS estimates, while all the other owner-managers’ human 
capital variables are always not statistically significant at conventional confidence levels. The 
variable DSerialit produces a positive but insignificant effect on NTBF sales growth.10 Thus, 
                                                            
10 This result is not totally unexpected if compared with previous evidence on the drivers of NTBF growth in the 
Italian economy. A previous analysis on a comparable sample of Italian NTBFs reveals a negligible impact of 
pre-entry managerial experience on their sales growth (e.g. Colombo & Grilli, 2010). In this respect, note also 
that we investigated if the experience gained by founders in previous occupations as managers of other firms 
exerted any impact on sales growth dynamics. The related dummy variable capturing the presence in the 
entrepreneurial team of entrepreneurs with previous managerial experience turns out to be positive but 
statistically insignificant, while the main results of our analysis remain unchanged.   
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we conclude that H1 finds only weak support, and hypothesis H2 will be investigated 
especially with reference to the effect of founders’ specific work experience rather than the 
impact of past entrepreneurial episodes. 
Accordingly, we find that founders’ specific work experience does exert an 
entrepreneurial imprinting effect, supporting hypothesis H2. Estimates of equation (2) reveal 
that SpecWorkExpit loses statistical significance, while the corresponding variable computed 
at firm’s inception, SpecWorkExpi0, is the only one to show a positive and statistical 
significant coefficient, at 5%  in OLS and 10% statistical significance level  in GMM-SYS 
regressions. The effect is also of relevant economic magnitude: taking GMM-SYS estimates, 
a one-year increase in this specific variable produces in the long run an average increase in 
the size of the benchmark firm of +8.34% (statistically significant at 10%). The difference 
between not having and having a large endowment of specific human capital at foundation 
may be extremely dramatic. When we look globally at the vector FoundingTeamSHCi, 
passing from no entrepreneurial experience (DSeriali0 = 0) and a very low level of specific 
work experience (SpecWorkExpi0 = 5 years, 5° percentile) to an opposite situation 
characterized by an extremely important amount of founders’ specific human capital 
(DSeriali0 = 1; SpecWorkExpi0 = 79 years, 95° percentile) produces an immediate increase in 
size of +217.03% (GMM-SYS estimates, effect significant at 10% statistical level). 
Interestingly, after controlling for the initial endowment at foundation, the evolution 
of human capital in the top management team has no significant effects on the NTBF sales 
growth performance. Finally, the estimates show that an NTBF’s age has a linear positive 
significant impact on sales growth (in GMM-SYS estimates only).  
Robustness checks 
 We also conducted a range of robustness checks in order to verify the veracity of our 
findings related to the entrepreneurial imprinting effect.  
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Alternative operationalization of variables and models’ specification. The results of the first 
robustness check is provided in Tables 6 and 7 – these two tables are analogues of Tables 4 
and 5 in that they estimate the models presented in Equations 1 and 2. However, in this 
robustness section, we estimate the models using the averaged (mean) value across 
entrepreneurial teams. Specifically, we use the team’s average (rather than the total) number 
of years of graduate and post-graduate education and of specific and generic work experience 
of founders and of owner-managers of firm i at time t. The substitution of variables capturing 
total years with the corresponding averaged covariates (i.e. Educ_avgit, SpecWorkExp_avgit, 
OtherWorkExp_avgit, Educ_avgi0, SpecWorkExp_avgi0, OtherWorkExp_avgi0) lead to broadly 
close results with those already exposed and still confirm (particularly in the GMM-SYS 
estimates) that founders’ previous work experience in the same industry is the only source of 
an imprinting effect on firm sales growth.  
We also use further alternative strategies for the operationalization of variables of 
interest. First, SpecWorkExp_avgit was augmented year-by-year in order to capture the fact 
that entrepreneurs acquire specific work experience as their NTBFs continue to operate in 
high-tech markets. Secondly, to avoid any overlap between the vectors of human capital 
variables at foundation, the vectors EntrepreneurialTeamSHCit and 
EntrepreneurialTeamGHCit were pre-multiplied by (1-DSeedit), where DSeedit is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the NTBF is at founding time. Again results in both cases were in 
line with those presented. 
[Table 6 about here] 
[Table 7 about here] 
In Table 8, we estimated Equation 2 using a restricted sample of observations, which 
is based on 609 observations (116 firms). The sample was restricted to include only those 
NTBFs that had experienced a change in the founding managerial team: those who hadn’t 
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were excluded from the analysis. The consequent drastic reduction in sample size makes 
infeasible the use of the GMM technique so we are forced to rely only on OLS estimates. 
Again, results obtained from the restricted sample corroborated those related to the full 
sample (see Table 5) and point to the industry-specific work experience of the founding team 
as the only statistically significant variable.11  
[Table 8 about here] 
In Table 9, two final robustness checks were undertaken by including some additional 
firm-level explanatory variables (column 1) and the inverse Mills ratio on firm exit (column 
2) in order to control for potential omitted variable and survivorship biases, respectively. 
Again the high number of instruments that this augmented specification would have implied 
make the use of GMM-SYS problematic and we again rely solely on OLS. The first 
additional explanatory variable we include is an impulse dummy that takes value one in the 
year the NTBF i established a technological (commercial) alliance: DTechAllianceit 
(DCommAllianceit).12 There is evidence suggesting that such an alliance may have an impact 
on NTBF performance (see Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Stuart, 2000). We also include 
a dummy variable (DIncubatedit) that takes the value one if NTBF i is in an incubator or in a 
business innovation center (BIC) at time t (note that we control for entry year in and exit year 
from the incubator/BIC). This may affect the NTBF performance since there are 
opportunities to learn (and get support) from others in an incubator (see Mian, 1996). To 
capture the effects of government support for business ventures, we include two dummy 
                                                            
11 We also conducted other robustness checks. Our sample also includes venture capital (VC)-backed firms. In 
particular, 22 firms received VC during their life (out of 338 firms). VC investors are able to spur the growth of 
investee companies (see Bertoni, Colombo, & Grilli, 2011) and are likely to weak the positive relationship 
between entrepreneurs’ human capital and firm growth (Colombo & Grilli, 2010). To control for that, we run 
regressions excluding VC-backed firms from our estimates. Results are very similar to those previously 
discussed. 
12 We also try other specifications in which we include alternatively: i) two step dummies that take value one 
from the year the NTBF i established a technological or commercial alliance on; ii) two step dummies that take 
value one if the the NTBF i established a technological or commercial alliance in all years of operation. The 
results are unchanged.  
24 
variables which equal one if the NTBF received any public financing by central government 
(DPubFin_Govit) or by a local government (DPubFin_Locit) (see Audretsch, Link, & Scott, 
2002; Link & Scott, 2010). Lastly, we include a dummy variable (DInternationalit) to capture 
whether NTBF i has (at least) one subsidiary in a foreign country (see Kogut & Zander, 
1993). We also controlled for geographical location by including a series of Italian regional 
(NUTS 2 level) dummies. 
The results for this extended model are presented in Table 9. Little has changed in the 
results reported in this table: the founders’ specific work experience variable is still positive 
and significant, confirming our finding on its imprinting effect on NTBF sales growth. The 
only additional explanatory variable that we have included in this model that has any 
statistical significance is DInternationalit. This variable is positively signed which indicates 
that new ventures with a foreign subsidiary have higher sales growth, ceteris paribus.  
[Table 9 about here] 
Test for survivorship bias. RITA is an unbalanced panel dataset. The unbalanced nature may 
be caused by a sample selection issue. In fact, sample NTBFs might exit from the RITA 
dataset because of several events: cease of operations, bankruptcy or merger/acquisition 
with/by another firm. Following Wooldridge (1995), we implemented a variable-addition test 
to detect potential survivorship bias in our data (see also Baltagi, 2003, pp. 223-224). For 
each year, from an exit equation estimated through a probit model, we compute the inverse 
Mills ratio (IMR) term to be inserted in the main equation using the unbalanced panel. The 
dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 in the year the focal firm exited the 
sample. The independent variables include firm size, firm age, and other control variables. 
The results are reported in Table 9. The coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio is not 
significant, thus suggesting the absence of any remarkable survivorship bias in our estimates. 
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Moreover, results related to the positive and significant effect of the variable SpecWorkExpi0 
are further confirmed. 
 
Conclusions 
Summary of findings 
In this paper, we have investigated the presence of an ‘entrepreneurial imprinting 
effect’ on entrepreneurial ventures’ sales growth. By controlling for the (potential) exit of 
founders or addition of new owner-managers in the entrepreneurial team over time, we have 
disentangled the impact of founders’ human capital from the impact that the actual stock of 
human capital possessed by firm’s owner-managers continue to exert over time. Previous 
studies in high-tech entrepreneurship have generally found a positive effect of entrepreneurs’ 
specific human capital on firm growth. But such studies are not able to test the potential 
imprinting effect exerted by entrepreneurs on their venture. In fact, the positive effect they 
found may simply reflect the fact that more skilled and experienced entrepreneurs run their 
ventures better than less skilled and less experienced ones. This is due to the fact that such 
studies do not have variables (or at least proxies) to capture the dynamics of the 
entrepreneurial team over time. This way, any potential positive impact of founders’ human 
capital on venture performance might be driven by the evolution of owner-managers’ human 
capital in the entrepreneurial team. 
Our study is the first systematic analysis on the existence of an entrepreneurial 
imprinting effect on NTBF sales growth. The test we performed was made possible by the 
availability of a longitudinal dataset (RITA) composed by 338 Italian NTBFs with a more 
fine-grained description of the complete evolution of founders and owner-managers’ human 
capital over time than the one available in previous analyses. The longitudinal nature of our 
large dataset also enabled us to properly control for the potential endogeneity bias that may 
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affect the relationship between entrepreneurs’ human capital and venture growth. The 
analysis points to the existence of an important entrepreneurial imprinting effect exerted by 
founders’ specific human capital, and most prominently by founders’ specific pre-entry work 
experience, on the sales growth performance of NTBFs. Conversely, entrepreneurs’ generic 
human capital is found to play a negligible role in shaping growth dynamics of NTBFs.  
Limitations 
This work represents a first empirical test on the existence of an entrepreneurial 
imprinting effect exerted by founders’ human capital on the (sales) growth of entrepreneurial 
ventures. Several future research directories can be traced on the basis of some (unavoidable) 
limitations of the present study. First, we focus here on a sample of NTBFs based in Italy and 
this calls into question the generalizability of our results with respect as to different sectors 
and different countries. If we can speculate that differences might be relevant when we 
consider less technological-intensive industries or more technology-advanced countries than 
Italy, these conjectures are worth of being investigated in future work. Secondly, our 
longitudinal sample presents a sufficient but limited degree of turbulence in the 
entrepreneurial team’s turnover over time (slightly more than one third of our sample firms 
experienced the exit and/or the entry of at least one member in the entrepreneurial team). 
Estimating the relationship of interest in more “turbulent” environments in terms of 
entrepreneurial team turnover would represent an important test of the validity of the findings 
presented here. 
Implications 
This notwithstanding, we believe that important implications can be drawn from our 
analysis at various levels. From a theoretical perspective, our analysis corroborates the 
knowledge- and competence-based (Grant, 1996) view of high-tech ventures, but at the same 
time it emphasizes the importance of an evolutionary and path-dependent perspective (Nelson 
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& Winter, 1982, 2002) in order to better understand an entrepreneurial venture’s development 
and its ultimate performance. If “a fundamental proposition in evolutionary economics is that 
firms have ways of doing things that show strong elements of continuity” (p. 11,  Dosi, 
Nelson, & Winter, 2000), our work provides evidence that this continuity also passes through 
founders’ capabilities and their specific knowledge. And that the initial moves of capable 
entrepreneurs heavily reverberate in subsequent stages of a firm’s life. At the same time, our 
analysis is not necessarily at odds with all those studies that point to dynamic capabilities as 
an important driver of the long-term performance of entrepreneurial ventures (e.g. Eisenhardt 
& Martin 2000; Winter, 2003). In this respect, our work suggests that, after foundation, 
injections and/or exits of new owner- managers (and their human capital) in/from the 
entrepreneurial team are not an effective way of rapidly adapting to the environmental 
context. Conversely, founders have the possibility to determine by the very beginning of 
operations the ability of their firms to change and promptly react to modified business 
conditions. In doing so, our work provides empirical support to Teece & Pisano (1994) when 
they claim that “the competitive advantage of firms stems from dynamic capabilities rooted 
in high performance routines operating inside the firm, embedded in the firm’s processes and 
conditioned by its history. Because of imperfect factor markets, or more precisely the non-
tradability of ‘soft’ assets like values, culture, and organizational experience, these 
capabilities generally cannot be bought; they must be built (p. 553)”. We showed that more 
skilled and experienced entrepreneurs are more likely to succeed in this (difficult) task. 
From an entrepreneurial perspective, we highlight that the initial endowment of 
(specific) human capital is not likely just to have a transient effect on a high-tech venture 
sales growth. In this respect, entrepreneurs have to be aware that initial (knowledge) 
resources are of paramount importance because they do not only affect the immediate 
performance but also determine the long-run one. Would-be entrepreneurs have to bear in 
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mind that bringing other very competent individuals into the entrepreneurial team right from 
the venture’s inception can be a crucial determinant for the success of the business idea while 
future injections are likely to produce limited effects. By the same token, the exit from the 
entrepreneurial team of a competent founder could be of little concern for the prospects of the 
firm, if this founder has had enough time to imprint with his knowledge the entrepreneurial 
venture’s organizational practices, routines and culture.       
As a consequence, our study provides to policymakers some important potential 
channels through which the competitiveness of an entrepreneurial venture might be increased. 
By highlighting how founders’ specific knowledge resources determine high-tech new 
ventures’ sales growth, our work emphasizes that in order to establish a vibrant and solid 
high-tech entrepreneurial segment, policymakers should target the quality of the 
entrepreneurs rather than simply the quantity of the individuals who decide to establish a new 
venture. Thus, it is important not just to incentivize more individuals to turn to self-
employment but to convince those individuals who have the best chances to succeed to create 
their own new high-tech venture. In this respect, we very much share the view of Eberhart, 
Eesley, & Eisenhardt (2012) in saying that easing entry into the self-employment condition 
could be less effective than alleviating burdens arising from the exit. Especially in the 
European Union, targeted policy interventions are needed both at the regulatory and cultural 
levels in order to limit the opportunity cost of high-tech entrepreneurship and enable a rapid 
second start for honestly failed high-tech entrepreneurs (see on this point also Armour & 
Cumming, 2006).  
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Table 1: Definition of independent variables 
Variable Definition 
Lagged dependent variable  
Salesit-1 Logarithm of sales of firm i at time t-1 
Founding team variables  
Specific human capital  
SpecWorkExpi0 Total number of years of work experience of founders in the same industry of 
firm i before firm's foundation 
DSeriali0 One for firms with one or more founders with a previous self-employment 
experience before firm's foundation 
Generic human capital  
Educi0 Total number of years of education at graduate and post-graduate level of 
founders of firm i before firm's foundation 
OtherWorkExpi0 Total number of years of work experience of founders in other industries than 
the one of firm i before firm's foundation 
Control  




Specific human capital  
SpecWorkExpit Total number of years of work experience of owners in the same industry of 
firm i at time t 
DSerialit One for firms with one or more owners with a previous self-employment 
experience at time t 
Generic human capital  
Educit Total number of years of education at graduate and post-graduate level of 
owners of firm i at time t  
OtherWorkExpit Total number of years of work experience of owners in other industries than the 
one of firm i at time t 
Control  
NOwnersit Number of owner-managers of firm i at time t 
Firm-level controls  
Ageit Number of years since firm’s foundation at year t 
Age2it Squared term of Ageit 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables 
Variable Mean Median S.D. Min Max
Salesit 12.8118 12.9420 1.8603 0 18.2802
SpecWorkExpi0 14.2500 5 21.2780 0 129
DSeriali0 0.4128 0 0.4925 0 1
Educi0 35.9000 34 18.6958 8 147
OtherWorkExpi0 31.1641 23 28.2853 0 239
NFoundersi0 2.3462 2 1.0718 1 7
SpecWorkExpit 14.0320 5 22.0189 0 140
DSerialit 0.4096 0 0.4919 0 1
Educit 36.3994 31.5000 19.1369 8 168
OtherWorkExpit 31.2038 24 27.2966 0 191
NOwnersit 2.3667 2 1.1276 1 8






Table 3: Dynamics of entrepreneurial teams 
Variable Mean Median S.D. Min Max
ΔNOwners 0.0525 0 1.1812 -3 4
ΔEduc 1.2890 0 18.3181 -39 49
ΔSpecWorkExp -0.5452 0 12.7586 -49 46
ΔOtherWorkExp 0.1379 0 22.6470 -88 70
ΔSerial -0.0082 0 0.2838 -1 1
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Table 4: Econometric results – Equation 1 
 (1) (2) 
 OLS GMM 
Salesit-1 0.4846*** 0.3087*** 
 (0.0517) (0.0534) 
Entrepreneurial team variables   
SpecWorkExpit 0.0053** 0.0168* 
 (0.0027) (0.0087) 
DSerialit 0.1315 0.2819 
 (0.0935) (0.3249) 
Educit -0.0060 -0.0024 
 (0.0055) (0.0119) 
OtherWorkExpit -0.0020 -0.0037 
 (0.0021) (0.0049) 
NOwnersit 0.1478 0.1282 
 (0.0969) (0.2024) 
   
Firm-level controls    
Ageit 0.0215 0.1529** 
 (0.0292) (0.0649) 
Age2it 0.0012 -0.0032 
 (0.0012) (0.0033) 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Constant 6.2183*** 7.7481*** 
 (0.5863) (0.6596) 
Number of observations 1560 1560 
Number of firms 338 338 
R2 0.5953 - 
AR(1) - -1.49 
AR(2) - -1.03 
Hansen - 204.85[219] 
Note: standard errors in parentheses; degrees of freedom in square brackets. Year dummies are included in the 
estimates (coefficients are omitted in the table). Estimates are derived from OLS regressions with robust 
clustered standard errors and two-step system GMM with finite sample correction (Windmeijer, 2005). * p < 
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 5: Econometric results – Equation 2 
 (1) (2) 
 OLS GMM 
Salesit-1 0.4807*** 0.3035*** 
 (0.0509) (0.0573) 
Founding team variables   
SpecWorkExpi0 0.0179** 0.0253* 
 (0.0086) (0.0137) 
DSeriali0 0.2283 0.2979 
 (0.1984) (0.5749) 
Educi0 -0.0114 -0.0429 
 (0.0131) (0.0297) 
OtherWorkExpi0 -0.0059 -0.0098 
 (0.0070) (0.0153) 
NFoundersi0 0.0642 0.7345 
 (0.2171) (0.6330) 
Entrepreneurial team variables   
SpecWorkExpit -0.0119 0.0014 
 (0.0088) (0.0138) 
DSerialit -0.1054 0.2220 
 (0.1977) (0.3740) 
Educit 0.0026 0.0214 
 (0.0120) (0.0185) 
OtherWorkExpit 0.0035 -0.0024 
 (0.0075) (0.0083) 
NOwnersit 0.1127 -0.0829 
 (0.1805) (0.2239) 
   
Firm-level controls   
Ageit 0.0211 0.1191* 
 (0.0286) (0.0716) 
Age2it 0.0011 -0.0017 
 (0.0012) (0.0032) 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Constant 6.3369*** 7.4557*** 
 (0.5987) (1.0221) 
Number of observations 1560 1560 
Number of firms 338 338 
R2 0.6001 - 
AR(1) - -1.26 
AR(2) - -1.08 
Hansen - 198.21[214] 
Note: standard errors in parentheses; degrees of freedom in square brackets. Year dummies are included in the 
estimates (coefficients are omitted in the table). Estimates are derived from OLS regressions with robust 
clustered standard errors and two-step system GMM with finite sample correction (Windmeijer, 2005). * p < 
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 6: Robustness check (averaged variables) – Equation 1 
 (1) (2) 
 OLS GMM 
Salesit-1 0.4836*** 0.2748*** 
 (0.0515) (0.0639) 
Entrepreneurial team variables   
SpecWorkExp_avgit 0.0159** 0.0635*** 
 (0.0070) (0.0205) 
DSerialit 0.0950 -0.1366 
 (0.0945) (0.2989) 
Educ_avgit -0.0197 0.0186 
 (0.0152) (0.0634) 
OtherWorkExp_avgit -0.0023 0.0055 
 (0.0053) (0.0199) 
NOwnersit 0.0620* 0.2476** 
 (0.0334) (0.0976) 
Firm-level controls   
Ageit 0.0218 0.1683* 
 (0.0289) (0.0861) 
Age2it 0.0012 -0.0032 
 (0.0012) (0.0039) 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Constant 6.5153*** 7.1717*** 
 (0.6460) (1.4721) 
Number of observations 1560 1560 
Number of firms 338 338 
R2 0.5973 - 
AR(1) - -1.37 
AR(2) - -1.02 
Hansen - 202.25[219] 
Note: standard errors in parentheses; degrees of freedom in square brackets. Year dummies are included in the 
estimates (coefficients are omitted in the table). Estimates are derived from OLS regressions with robust 
clustered standard errors and two-step system GMM with finite sample correction (Windmeijer, 2005). * p < 
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 7: Robustness check (averaged variables) – Equation 2 
 (1) (2) 
 OLS GMM 
Salesit-1 0.4813*** 0.2651*** 
 (0.0510) (0.0588) 
Founding team variables   
SpecWorkExp_avg i0 0.0262 0.0649* 
 (0.0169) (0.0369) 
DSeriali0 0.2141 0.2626 
 (0.2089) (0.6929) 
Educ_avgi0 0.0024 -0.0860 
 (0.0389) (0.1214) 
OtherWorkExp_avg i0 -0.0118 -0.0638 
 (0.0170) (0.0514) 
NFoundersi0 -0.0915 0.0898 
 (0.0622) (0.1659) 
Entrepreneurial team variables   
SpecWorkExp_avg it -0.0090 0.0335 
 (0.0170) (0.0288) 
DSerialit -0.1026 0.0256 
 (0.2098) (0.4367) 
Educ_avgit -0.0242 0.0653 
 (0.0400) (0.1027) 
OtherWorkExp_avgit 0.0078 0.0307 
 (0.0165) (0.0321) 
NOwnersit 0.1288** 0.2848** 
 (0.0591) (0.1377) 
Firm-level controls   
Ageit 0.0247 0.1524 
 (0.0286) (0.1032) 
Age2it 0.0010 -0.0031 
 (0.0012) (0.0045) 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Constant 6.6194*** 7.8578*** 
 (0.6465) (1.7458) 
Number of observations 1560 1560 
Number of firms 338 338 
R2 0.6002 - 
AR(1) - -1.35 
AR(2) - -1.02 
Hansen - 196.82[214] 
Note: standard errors in parentheses; degrees of freedom in square brackets. Year dummies are included in the 
estimates (coefficients are omitted in the table). Estimates are derived from OLS regressions with robust 
clustered standard errors and two-step system GMM with finite sample correction (Windmeijer, 2005). * p < 
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Founding team variables  










Entrepreneurial team variables  















Year dummies Yes 
Constant 6.3582***  
 (0.9806) 
Number of observations 609 
Number of firms 116 
R2 0.6199 
Note: standard errors in parentheses; degrees of freedom in square brackets. Year dummies are included in the 
estimates (coefficients are omitted in the table). Estimates are derived from OLS regressions with robust 
clustered standard errors. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 9: Robustness check (additional regressors and IMR) - Equation 2 
 (1) (2) 
 OLS OLS 
Salesit-1 0.4490*** 0.4756*** 
 (0.0512) (0.0515) 
Founding team variables   
SpecWorkExp i0 0.0173** 0.0182** 
 (0.0084) (0.0089) 
DSeriali0 0.1774 0.2604 
 (0.2044) (0.2124) 
Educi0 -0.0113 -0.0096 
 (0.0123) (0.0137) 
OtherWorkExp i0 -0.0046 -0.0083 
 (0.0068) (0.0072) 
NFoundersi0 0.0570 0.0467 
 (0.1881) (0.2280) 
Entrepreneurial team variables   
SpecWorkExp it -0.0110 -0.0125 
 (0.0086) (0.0091) 
DSerialit -0.0969 -0.1267 
 (0.2015) (0.2127) 
Educit 0.0063 -0.0007 
 (0.0119) (0.0126) 
OtherWorkExpit 0.0022 0.0056 
 (0.0073) (0.0076) 
NOwnersit 0.0828 0.1592 
 (0.1598) (0.1921) 
Firm-level controls   
Ageit 0.0413 0.0228 
 (0.0289) (0.0291) 
Age2it 0.0003 0.0011 
 (0.0011) (0.0012) 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Constant 7.2172*** 6.4739*** 
 (0.6451) (0.5923) 
Additional variables   
Region dummies Yes - 
DTechAllianceit -0.0182 - 
 (0.2246)  
DCommAllianceit 0.1156 - 
 (0.1802)  
DIncubatedit -0.0562 - 
 (0.1532)  
DPubFin_Govit -0.0144 - 
 (0.3104)  
DPubFin_Locit 0.0496 - 
 (0.1175)  
DInternationalit 1.1282*** - 
 (0.1786)  
IMR - 0.4408 
  (0.3155) 
Number of observations 1560 1512 
Number of firms 338 331 
R2 0.6211 0.5970 
Note: standard errors in parentheses; degrees of freedom in square brackets. Year dummies are included in the 
estimates (coefficients are omitted in the table). Estimates are derived from OLS regressions with robust 
clustered standard errors. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
